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1. Introduction 
Yardstick (benchmark) regulation for public utilities shows promise for improving the 
performance of regulated monopolies.  Regulatory and institutional reforms in developed and 
developing countries during the past decade has stimulated interest in benchmarking as a tool for 
evaluating the effectiveness of the reforms, introducing competition through yardstick comparisons, and 
providing useful information about the X factor utilized in price cap regulation. (Shleifer, 1985; 
Carrington et al., 2002)1. For instance, benchmarking is now part of the process of setting price caps in the 
UK. OFWAT, the water regulator in UK, use different econometric models to create efficiency bands and 
then set the X factor and price cap based on the efficiency bands (Saal and Parker, 2006).  
The empirical literature on yardstick regulation contains some studies of the water sector in 
developing countries. Most of these studies have not considered the role of quality in the benchmarking 
processes due to data limitations and methodological issues. In an earlier study, Lin (2005) utilized a 
stochastic cost frontier to illustrate the importance of incorporating quality into performance comparisons. 
This study extends that work by: (1) providing more empirical evidence about firm performance and 
productivity and quality change of the water sector in developing countries (using Peru as a case study); 
(2) proposing a benchmarking framework based on a preference-structure DEA model and quality 
incorporated Malmquist index; the approach allows regulators to apply their valuations of different 
quality dimensions to the benchmarking regulation they impose.  The framework enables the 
decomposition of firm-level productivity change into efficiency change, technology change (frontier 
change) and quality change.  
As an indicator of the firm-specific overall multi-dimensional quality change, the quality change 
indicator can provide useful information to the regulators about the Q (quality) factor in the quality 
dependent price cap regulation: CPI-X+Q. In addition to traditional performance indicators based on DEA 
and the Malmquist Productivity index, this study utilizes the preference structure DEA model and 
                                                        
1 In practice, benchmarking is widely used in the regulatory sectors such as the transportation sector in Costa Rica, 
telecommunications sector in Hungary, electricity and telecom sectors in Dutch, and electricity sector in Norway and New South 
Wales (Parker, Dassler and Saal, 2006). Burns et al. (2006) review the information revelation incentives for electricity utilities 
and the use of benchmarking in setting electricity distribution prices in Austria, Netherlands and Britain. 
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quality-incorporated Malmquist Productivity index. To the authors’ knowledge, the preference structure 
DEA model has not been used in regulatory studies and the quality-incorporated Malmquist Productivity 
Index has not been used in water studies to date2 (due to data availability issues).  
The results show that the preference structure DEA model can be used to reflect the weight given 
to quality in regulatory objectives. After imposing preference weights on the quality outputs (based on the 
current Peru water evaluation system), the correlation between the efficiency results of a basic model 
(only physical outputs) and comprehensive model (both physical and quality outputs) is seen to be much 
lower than the correlation between the comprehensive model and quality model (with three quality 
variables as the only outputs).  Inclusion of quality indicators as desired outputs has a significant impact 
on firm efficiency rankings. In addition, analysis of the quality-incorporated Malmquist Productivity 
Index shows that on average productivity grew during 1998-1999, 2000-2001 and 1998-2001; 
productivity appears to have declined during 1999-2000. The average quality of service improved slightly 
during 1998-1999 and 1999-2000, but declined during 2000-2001. Overall, service quality declined 
slightly from 1998-2001, indicating inadequate incentives for the publicly-owned companies to improve 
their service quality under the regulatory scheme applicable for those years. The study also tests the 
multiplicative separability assumption in the process of decomposing the Malmquist Index using both a t 
test and nonparametric statistical test. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short literature review of 
benchmarking studies in public utility industries and reviews the reasons for taking quality variables into 
account in the benchmarking process. Section 3 provides background information regarding the Peru 
water sector and summarizes the current performance evaluation system. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the 
techniques used in the current evaluation and present empirical models and results. 
2. Literature Review 
Benchmarking studies based on parametric (e.g. Stochastic Frontier Analysis) and 
non-parametric (e.g. Data Envelopment Analysis) methods have been conducted in different infrastructure 
                                                        
2 Giannakis, Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) and Estache, Perelman and Trujillo (2004) applied similar techniques to the 
electricity and railway industries, respectively. 
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industries during the past few years. For example, Carrington et al. (2002) evaluate the relative utility 
performance in Australian natural gas industry. Using DEA and SFA methods, Estache et al.(2004) and 
Frasi and Fillippini (2004) measure the efficiency of electricity distribution companies in South America 
and Switzerland, respectively. Lam and Shiu (2004) calculate the efficiency values and the efficiency 
change in China’s electricity generation industry. Using data from Ukraine electricity distribution firms, 
Berg et. al. (2005)  find that private operators respond more aggressively to cost plus regulation to 
increase shareholder value through cost inflation though privatization improved some dimensions of 
performance. Knittel (2002) checks the impact of alternative regulatory methods on the utility efficiency 
in the U.S. electricity distribution industry. For more detailed reviews, see the studies by Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2001) and Estache et. al. (2005).  
Non-energy network industries have also received attention. In telecommunication, Majumdar 
(1997) evaluates the effect of incentive regulation on the technical efficiency of U.S. local exchange 
carriers between 1988 and 1993. Uri (2001) uses the Malmquist Productivity index to calculate 
productivity change due to the implementation of incentive regulation in telecommunications. In the 
water sector, Saal and Parker (2000, 2001) check the impact of privatization and regulation on 
productivity growth and the total cost of the water sector in England and Wales. They underscore the 
importance of using quality adjusted outputs (adjusted by indices of the relative quality of drinking water 
and sewerage treatment). Saal and Parker (2006) employs a quality-adjusted panel input distance 
stochastic frontier to estimate productivity growth rates for the water operations of the water sector in 
England and Wales between 1993 and 2003. They further decompose the productivity change into 
efficiency change, technology change and scale change. Wallsten and Kosec (2005) include several 
dimensions of quality in their comparison of privately and publicly owned water utilities in the U.S.: 
violations of the maximum levels of health-based contaminants and violations of monitoring and 
reporting regulations. Berg and Lin (2006) examine a methodological issue associated with benchmarking: 
the consistency of performance rankings based on non-parametric (DEA) and parametric (Stochastic 
production frontier and distance function) methods (in the Peruvian context). Two service quality 
measures (coverage of service and continuity of service) are incorporated as outputs in the models. The 
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present study adds the pass rate of chlorine tests as additional quality indicator and focuses on how 
prioritizing objectives can be incorporated into the benchmarking process.  
Most other water studies have not incorporated quality variables into the analysis, but examine 
the impacts of other factors. Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998), and Ashton (2000) estimate the water utility 
firm efficiency in United Kingdom. Estache and Rossi (2002) use 1995 data from 50 water companies in 
19 Asian countries to explore the effects of ownership on utility performance. They do not find significant 
differences between private and public water utilities. However, Estache and Kouassi, (2002) find 
empirical evidence supporting the view that private operators are more efficient than public operators in 
Africa. Corton (2003) uses OLS cost function to evaluate the efficiency of Peruvian water utilities. 
Tupper and Resende (2004) use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to develop efficiency scores for 
twenty Brazilian water utilities during 1996–2000 and propose a procedure for constructing a linear 
reimbursement rule that constitutes a yardstick competition mechanism. Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) find that 
private utilities in Africa are associated with better performance than state owned utilities based on DEA 
results but not in the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) models. 
As noted above, only a few studies focus on the water sector in developing countries and include 
quality elements in the benchmarking processes. There are two reasons for the inclusion of quality aspects 
into our study. First, if we ignore the quality aspects in the benchmarking, “low-cost, low quality” 
companies may be label as “efficient” companies, which may distort the original intention of 
benchmarking (Sappington, 2005). In addition, quality can be an important issue in Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP). For instance, Saal and Parker (2001) show that the TFP change in the U.K. water 
sector appears to have been extremely slow in recent years.  However, quality has improved significantly 
because of the large increases in minimum standards, which required significant outlays. Thus, the use of 
unadjusted TFP change measures during this period understates actual TFP improvements (measured in a 
more comprehensive manner).   
Second, service quality is an important issue in water sector. According to the World Bank (2003), 
more than 1 billion people in the developing countries lack access to clean water and almost 1.2 billion 
people lack adequate sanitation. An estimated 12.2 million people die every year due to the diseases 
 5
directly related to drinking contaminated water. The World Commission on Water estimated that 
mitigating water and sanitation problems would require US$600-800 billion between 2000 and 2010. 
Therefore, water regulators in developing countries may put extra weight on improving service quality 
and coverage when evaluating sector performance. 
3.  Peru Water Sector and Its Performance Evaluation System 
Corton (2003) characterized the water sector of Peru as one with serious problems, including 
inadequate system maintenance, a high level of unaccounted-for water, excess staff, low metering rates, 
and low water quality. In order to effectively monitor the monopoly suppliers and improve their firm 
performance, in 1992 the Peru government created SUNASS to regulate water and sanitation services. 
SUNASS attempts to ensure that consumers receive the best possible drinking water and sewerage service, 
in terms of adequate quality, quantity, continuity, coverage and fair price. Its functions include 
economic regulation, supervision, sanctions, setting rules/norms and dispute resolution (between 
customers and service providers). This agency’s funding comes from a 1% surcharge on the 
invoicing from the service providers. The Board of Directors has five members: two from the 
First Ministry Office (one is appointed as Chairman), one from the Ministry of Finance, one 
from the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation and another one from the Office of 
Fair Competition. To promote better performance, SUNASS developed a Management Indicators 
System (MIS) with the help of the World Bank. The MIS collects data from utilities, making it possible to 
compare service providers.  The expectation was that low efficiency companies would gradually 
improve in response to greater pressure to perform efficiently. SUNASS selected nine performance 
indicators and categorized them into four dimensions:  
1. Quality of Service includes three variables: compliance with the residual chlorine rule, continuity of 
service, and percentage of water receiving chemical treatment.  
2. Coverage of Service Attained consists of two variables: water coverage and sewerage coverage.  
3. Management Efficiency reflects three variables: operating efficiency (a combination of continuity of 
service and the volume of water produced to serve each person at a connection), percentage of 
connections with meter installed, and the ratio of bills not yet collected to the total number of bills.  
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4. Managerial Finance Efficiency is defined by the ratio of direct costs and other expenses to revenues. 
The first two broad areas of efficiency are intended to represent the interests of society.  The third 
reflects the companies' performance, and the fourth represents the citizen-owner’s perspective. In order to 
obtain a single measure of performance, each indicator expressed as a percentage is multiplied by its 
weight (equal weight=1) and added together to obtain a total score for each company. This total per 
company is divided by nine, the number of indicators, to get the final score. The emphasis on social 
concerns is evident in the greater number of indicators related to performance affecting society.   
4. Methodology 
Efficiency measurement methods can be subdivided into parametric and non-parametric methods. 
The parametric methods of efficiency analysis rely on specified functional forms of production or cost 
functions; they utilize econometric techniques. Non-parametric methods use mathematical programming 
techniques and do not require specification of production or cost functions. Both methods have been 
applied widely in different industries such as electricity, telecommunication, gas and water. Berg and Lin 
(2006) examine the consistency of the performance rankings based on DEA and SFA models in the 
Peruvian context. They find that DEA and SFA distance function yield similar rankings and have 
comparable success for identifying the best and worst performing utilities3. Because DEA analysis can 
easily accommodate multiple inputs and multiple outputs simultaneously, it is employed as the analytic 
tool in this paper.4 DEA has been used in a number of recent water studies. For example, Thanassoulis 
(2000) reviewed DEA and its use in estimating potential cost savings at water companies in the context of 
the price review conducted by the regulator of water companies in England and Wales. Similarly, Tupper 
and Resende (2004) use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) supplemented by econometric analyses to 
provide efficiency scores for twenty Brazilian state water and sewage companies.  
4.1. DEA Analysis: CCR and BCC Models 
                                                        
3 This does not mean DEA and SFA always generate similar results. In some cases, the parametric and non-parametric methods 
do produce different results.  
4 The distance function can also accommodate multiple inputs and multiple outputs simultaneously (Coelli and Perelman, 2000). 
The distance function is generally expressed in flexible translog functional form because the Cobb-Douglas function imposes 
strong assumptions such as fixed returns to scale value and unitary elasticity of substitution. However, given the complexity of 
our models (3 inputs, 2 physical outputs and 4 quality outputs) and our modest sample size, translog will consume too many 
degrees of freedom (the model would contain 45 independent variables). Therefore, DEA models are used in this study.  
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Single-measure gap analysis is the simplest form of performance evaluation and benchmarking. 
For example, regulators in the water industry commonly use efficiency indicators, such as number of 
workers per connection and number of connections per 100 families, to assess utilities' performance5. 
However, these measures are not good substitutes for efficiency frontiers, which recognize the complex 
nature of interactions between multiple inputs and multiple outputs.6 Suppose m input items and s output 
items are selected. Let each Decision-making Unit j ),,2,1 ,( njDMU j L=  produces a vector of 
outputs ( sjjj yyy ,,, 21 K ) by using a vector of inputs ( mjjj xxx ,,, 21 K ). The output oriented CCR model 
is expressed with a real variableθ and a non-negative vector ( )Tnλλλλ K21=  of variables as 
follows: 0  ; ; s.t.   max*
11
≥=−=+= ∑∑
=
+
=
−
j
n
j
rorrjj
n
j
ioiijj ysyxsx λφλλφφ  
(i =1, 2,…, m; r =1,2,…,s; j =1,2,…,n)             (1) 
We define the input excesses 
−s and the output shortfalls 
+s and identify them as “slack” vectors by: 
oo yYsXxs −=−= +− λλθ ,                                     (2)  
The CCR model is built on the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) of activities. According to 
the BCC (Banker-Charnes-Cooper 1984) model, if the condition 1
1
=∑ =nj jλ  is added, then variable 
returns to scale (VRS) are imposed. For detailed information about CCR and BCC models, readers are 
referred to Cooper et al. (2004).  
4.2. DEA with Preference Structure 
The basic DEA models (CCR & BCC) are called radial efficiency measures, because these 
models adjust all inputs, or outputs, of a DMU by the same proportion. reaF &&  and Lovell (1978) 
                                                        
5 For instance, the high ratio of staff per connection in Peru may not indicate the inefficiency of the utility companies. It could be 
due to cheaper labor substituting for other inputs rather that over-staffing. Therefore, we need to use the multiple inputs/outputs 
frontier model to evaluate utility efficiency. 
6 DEA, the most typical non-parametric frontier method, is utilized here. DEA provides a mathematical programming method for 
estimating production frontiers and evaluating the relative efficiency of different decision-making units—here, water utilities. 
The advantages of the DEA model are that it does not require the specification of a functional form to be fitted, and can 
simultaneously accommodate multiple inputs and outputs. The technique also has its limitations: Rossi and Ruzzier (2000) show 
that the efficiency measures obtained with DEA can be very sensitive to the number of variables included in the model. As the 
ratio of number of variables/sample size goes up, the ability of DEA to discriminate among firms is sharply reduced, because it 
becomes more likely that a certain firm will find some set of weights to apply to its outputs and inputs which will make it appear 
as efficient. Another limitation of the non-parametric approach is that the DEA models cannot take the impacts of random noise 
or random error into account. 
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introduce a non-radial measure which allows non-proportional reduction in inputs, or non-proportional 
augmentation of outputs. The output oriented CRS model can be expressed as: 
0 ;0 ;1  ; ; s.t.  1max
111
≥≥≥==+ −
==
−
=
∑∑∑ ijrn
j
rorrjj
n
j
ioiijj
s
r
r syyxsxs
λφφλλφ    (3) 
       In original DEA formulations, DMUs are in a position to choose the weights to be assigned to 
each input and output in a way that maximizes its efficiency, subject to the system of weights being 
feasible for all other DMUs. This freedom of choice is equivalent to assuming that no input or output is 
more important than any other (Cooper et al., 2004). In our case, it is necessary to construct a model 
which integrates the regulator’ s preferences and value judgments in DEA models and estimate the targets 
according to these preferences7. Following Zhu (1996), the output oriented weighted non-radial 
preference model can be expressed 
0;0;0;1 ; ; s.t.   max
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where rB ( r =1,2,…,s) are user-specified preference weights which reflect the relative degree of 
desirability of the adjustments of the current input and output levels, respectively. The greater the 
weight rB , the higher the priority DMUo will give to increase its rth output. The basic non-radial DEA 
model (5) is a special case of (6) when all the rB ( r =1,2,…,s) are equal. The preference weights can be 
obtained by using Delphi-like techniques or an analytic process yielding some value hierarchy8.  
4.3. Malmquist Productivity Index 
So far, the focus has been on evaluating firm performance at a point in time.  To evaluate the 
efficiency change over time, the Malmquist Productivity Index is used in the following analysis9.  
Suppose each ),,2,1( njDMU j L=  produces a vector of outputs ),,( 1 tsjt jtj yyy L=  by 
using a vector of inputs ),,( 1
t
mj
t
j
t
j xxx L= at each time period t, Tt ,,2,1 L= . When multiple inputs 
                                                        
7 In the current SUNASS evaluation scheme, the emphasis on social concerns is evident in the greater number of indicators 
related to performance affecting society (coverage and treated water having implications for public health). This implicit 
weighting suggests that the regulator may prefer that companies improve service quality rather than cut their costs. Therefore, the 
regulator may want the benchmarking scheme to induce the DMUs to place greater emphasis on service quality outputs. 
8 For instance, Lynch, Buzas and Berg (1994) use hierarchical conjoint analysis to derive weights for dimensions of telephone 
service quality; the methodology could also be applied to water and other infrastructure industries. 
9 Please see, Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994), for detail background and estimation based on DEA models. 
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are used to produce multiple outputs, Shephard’s (1953) distance functions provide a functional 
characterization of the structure of production technology. The output distance function is defined on the 
output set, P(x), as: { })(/:min),(0 xPyyxd ∈= δδ      (5) 
The distance function ),( yxdo  will take a value which is less than or equal to one if the output vector, 
u, is an element of the feasible production set, P(x). The Malmquist productivity index is defined as: 
2
1
1
11111
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yxdyxdM      (6) 
Mo measures the productivity change between period t and t+1. A value greater than one indicates positive 
productivity growth from period t to period t+1. A value less than one indicates negative productivity 
growth from period t to period t+1. The distance function ),( yxdo  is calculated using the output 
oriented DEA model ( reaF && , Grosskopf and Lovell, 1994). 
The Malmquist productivity index can be decomposed into two components: efficiency change 
(catch-up effect) and frontier shift ( technological change).  
Efficiency change: ⎥⎦
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Mo = EC*TC                                                 (8) 
According to Fare et al. (1994), EC can be further decomposed into scale efficiency change and pure 
technology change. Ray and Desli (1997) pointed out the internal potential inconsistency problem of the 
further decomposition—both CRS and VRS models are used in the same decomposition. So this research 
uses the accepted decomposition shown in (8). 
 Quality-incorporated Malmquist Productivity Index 
Fare et al. (1995) extended the Malmquist Productivity Index to incorporate quality attributes into it 
in a productivity analysis of Swedish pharmacies. Similar to the preference structure model, this is a very 
useful model which has been rarely used in regulatory research and practice due to the lack of data on 
service quality. This study will extend the Malmquist Productivity Index to incorporate three quality 
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attributes and test our hypothesis about the separation of the quality attributes. Specifically, the 
technology set at t is defined as ( ){ ttttt xayxS :,,= can produce ty and }ta  
The output distance function becomes: 
{ }tttttttti Syaxyaxd ∈= )/,/,(:min),,( δδδ      (9) 
The quality change index between t and t+1 is defined as: 
),,(),,(
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From equation we can see, if tt aa ≥+1 , 11, ≥+ttQ  
The Quality-incorporated Malmquist Productivity Index between period 0 and 1 can be expressed as: 
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As before, this can be decomposed into technology change and efficiency change: 
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Equation (18) can be rewritten as: 
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A further decomposition of (20) is obtained if the distance functions are multiplicatively separable in 
quality attributes and inputs/outputs, i.e., if 
),()(A）,,( 1111t111 +++++++ ×= tttittttti yxdayaxd                                 (14) 
Quality-incorporated Malmquist Index can be expressed as: 
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The second part in the right hand side of (15) is exactly the same as equation (6), which can be further 
decomposed into technical change and efficiency change according to (7). Thus,  
1,1,1,1,
,
++++ ××= tttttttt iq ECTCQM                                             (16) 
If the productivity growth is the same with and without imposition of separability, (Malmquist Index 
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calculated using equation (13) is similar to that calculated using equation (16)), the service quality aspect 
may be interpreted as consistent with the assumption of multiplicative separability. 
5. Empirical Model and Results 
We are now in a position to analyze the actual performance of 38 Peruvian EPS from 1996-2001. 
Due to the missing value and extreme value problems, the sample size is 186 and involves an unbalanced 
panel. As Estache et al. (2004) note in their study, there are several possible ways to deal with the panel 
data within the context of DEA. One is to compute a frontier for each period and compare the efficiency 
of each firm relative to the frontier in each period. Another possibility is to treat the panel as a single 
cross-section (each firm year being considered as an independent observation) and pool the observations. 
This way, a single frontier is computed, and the relative efficiency of each firm in each period is 
calculated by reference to this single frontier. We follow this approach in order to increase the models’ 
discriminating power. CCR model is chosen because its result is highly correlated with that of BCC 
model and more importantly, the Malmquist Productivity Index is built on the CRS model10. ( reaF && et al. 
1994). 
5.1. Model Specification 
The models investigated here draw from the extensive benchmarking literature and earlier 
research on the characteristics of Peru’s water industry (high water loss, low water quality, and excess 
staff).  Model 1 is the widely-used and standard model in evaluating the utility performance. Model 2 is 
comprehensive (including water volume, number of customers, and quality outputs).  Model 3 includes 
only quality outputs.  Model 4 applies a preference structure approach to DEA. 
Model 1 (Standard): the inputs are operating costs and the number of water connections. The 
outputs are volume of water billed and the number of customers. Operating cost is calculated by adding 
sales cost, sales expenses and administrative expenses11. There are some implicit assumptions about using 
                                                        
10 As discussed earlier, CCR model is based on constant return to scale while the BCC model is built on variable returns to scale. 
11 Salary expenses are included into the operation costs. Specifically, salary expenses are contained in sale cost, sales expenses 
and administrative expenses, according to the type of work performed and whether it is under a contract. In the case of Peru, 
salary expenses represent more than 40% of the operating costs in 66% of the EPS (Corton, 2003). Therefore, we do not include 
the number of employees as an input in our models. By doing so, we also avoid the ambiguity of measuring the number of 
employees in Peru water sector, where many of the employees are contract workers. Using the number of total employees 
imposes an implicit assumption that the average number of working hours is similar across different types of workers and firms, 
which is a very strong assumption.   
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Operating cost as an input. For example, firms face the same accounting rules and comparable input 
prices. These would be strong assumptions for conducting cross-country benchmarking. For this reason, 
empirical studies such as Estache et al (2004) use only physical inputs and outputs. Since the focus here is 
on Peru, the assumptions are not unreasonable. More importantly, it is not always possible or desirable to 
use only physical inputs and outputs due to the difficulty of including all categories of inputs (from paper 
clips to computers) and accounting for input mix and input quality. Therefore, the operating cost, adjusted 
by GDP deflator, is used as an input in our study. Either the network length or the number of water 
connections can be used to measure the capital of the companies. Due to serious missing data problem for 
network length in 1996-98, the number of connections is used as an indicator of capital.12 
Volume of water billed and the number of customers (two widely used outputs) are both 
incorporated into Model 113. Because volume of water billed is highly correlated with the revenue, 
revenue is not included as an output.  
Model 2 (Comprehensive): In model 2, service quality elements are introduced as outputs since 
firms can always lower costs by reducing service quality. Table 4-1 shows the average and variance 
among firms. Three outputs capture dimensions of service quality: positive rate of chlorine tests, 
coverage of service and continuity of service.  
Coverage is defined as the population with access to water services as a percentage of the /total 
population under utility's nominal responsibility. It can be considered as one of the indicators of service 
quality because it is a direct measure of water availability to citizens in a municipality. Since water 
availability tends to be viewed as a citizen’s “right”, coverage reflects an important aspect of water 
service quality (Lin, 2005). According to a recent paper in Economist (Feb. 18, 2006, “The Americas: 
Quenching thirst; Peru's water industry"), fewer people in Peru have access to piped water (72%) than 
anywhere else in South America except Bolivia though the country has lots of fresh water. 
Percentage of samples with satisfactory residual chlorine and continuity of service are two of the 
                                                        
12 We also test the model with both network length and number of connections as inputs, the result is quite robust to our current 
model (correlation>0.94). 
13 Peru has a serious problem with water loss. According to official estimates, more than 40% of water is not billed, because of 
leaks or unauthorized connections.  Therefore, we use water billed, not water delivered, as an output to measure the utility 
company’s capability in system management, pipeline maintenance and commercial practice. 
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three indicators used by SUNASS to evaluate the service quality. Due to the serious missing data problem, 
the percentage of water receiving chemical treatment is not included as an output. Percentage of Samples 
with satisfactory residual chlorine is measured as a percentage of the sample where the residual chlorine 
(found in the water) satisfied the minimum requirements. Water is normally analysed for many quality 
parameters; residual chlorine is chosen by SUNASS to show the degree of protection against bacterial 
contamination (http://www.ib-net.org). Great variation also exists for these two variables. The lowest 
satisfactory rate is only 4.32% while the minimum continuity of service is 5 hours per day. These patterns 
suggest that quality should be taken into account when conducting benchmarking studies. Therefore, 
these two variables are taken to be customer service quality variables.  
[Table 1 here] 
  Model 3 (Preference Structure Weights): After comparing the results of the three models in the 
next section, Model 3 (the preference structure DEA model) is presented.  The SUNASS benchmarking 
scheme emphasizes social concerns: six out of nine indicators are related to the customer service quality 
we defined above. Due to the lack of other studies that might establish the weights, we regard the current 
SUNASS benchmarking scheme as a proxy of regulators’ preferences and give a weight 2 (6/3) to each of 
the three customer service quality variables while giving a weight of 1 to the other outputs14. The results 
of this Preference Structure DEA are then compared to the other models. The models are summarized in 
table 2. 
[Table 2 here] 
5.2 Empirical Results 
Efficiency Score (Model 2) 
Due to space constraints, the detailed results of only the quality-incorporated Model 2 are 
presented in Tables 3 below to illustrate the range of efficiency scores and the ranking of firms15. The 
                                                        
14 In the current SUNASS benchmarking scheme, six indicators (compliance with the residual chlorine rule, continuity of service, 
percentage of water receiving chemical treatment, water coverage, sewerage coverage and operating efficiency) are related to 
service quality. Since the SUNASS assigns an equal weight to the nine indicators, it implicitly imposes more (double) weight on 
service quality. 
15 To make the results more intuitive, the input-oriented efficiency scores are presented. The output-oriented efficiency scores are 
the inverse of the input-oriented efficiency scores in the CCR model. 
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other results are available from the author.   
[Table 3 here] 
Correlation matrix of efficiency score and ranking 
The Pearson Correlation matrix of efficiency scores16 is shown in Table 4 in order to check the 
pattern of correlations associated with the different models.  
[Table 4 here] 
The results shown in the correlation matrix are consistent with our expectation. The basic model 
has a very high correlation with the comprehensive model but a relatively low correlation with the 
preference weighted model. This shows that the “efficient” firms are not necessary the high quality 
suppliers.. The correlation between the basic model and comprehensive model is 0.882, which means 
physical outputs (customers and water billed) play more important roles in determining the firm 
efficiency if we use the original radial DEA model. After imposing the preference weight to the outputs 
(more weight to the 3 customer service quality variables), the correlation between basic model and 
weighted model is 0.168 while the correlation between comprehensive model and weighted model is 
0.292.: the quality output dimensions now play a more important role in determining the firm efficiency 
for the weighted model (preference Model 3).   
The above analysis showed that the regulators should first decide their target — reducing cost, 
improving service quality or considering both of them. Which aspect is preferred to the other? And then, 
they can choose the appropriate tools to conduct the benchmarking study.  
Malmquist Productivity Index and Quality-separated Malmquist Productivity Index 
In order to analyze the quality and efficiency change and test the assumption of quality separation, 
the Malmquist Productivity Index and Quality-separated Malmquist Productivity Index are calculated, 
respectively. The calculation is based on the comprehensive model (Model 3). The Malmquist 
Productivity Index is calculated using equation (6), (8), (11) and (12). The Quality-separated Malmquist 
Productivity Index is calculated using (10) and (13)-(16). Then the two indices are compared one another. 
If the results (performance ratings) are similar, it means the data are consistent with the assumption of 
                                                        
16 The Spearman’s ranking correlation matrix generates very similar results.  
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multiplicative separability. The calculation of Malmquist index requires a balanced panel data. Because of 
a serious missing data problem in year 1996 and 1997, the time period from 1998 to 2002 is utilized in the 
analysis. In addition, all the DMUs under evaluation are required to have complete data during this period. 
We exclude some problematic DMUs, and the sample size becomes 32 DMUs /year.  
From Table 5, we can see that (on average) productivity has a positive growth except for 
1999-2000. Frontier shift accounts for the productivity increase. This result is consistent with the finding 
by Saal and Parker (2006), who find that technical change (frontier shift) has been the dominant source of 
productivity growth in English and Welsh water sector. From Table 6, we can see that the 
quality-separated Malmquist productivity index depicts the same trend as before: on average, productivity 
only declines during 1999-2000. We also see on average the quality of service improved slightly during 
1998-1999 and 1999-2000, but it declined a bit during 2000-2001. In general, the average quality of 
service declined slightly from 1998-2001, which suggests a lack of incentives for companies to improve 
their service quality under the current regulatory scheme. In the current regulatory scheme, no formal 
rewards or penalties are linked to SUNASS’ ranking and the ranking is not widely distributed.  
[Table 5 & 6 here] 
Because quality improvement comes at a cost, municipal utilities may not have sufficient 
incentives to improve their service quality under this regulatory scheme. Some firms (like firm 3 and 7) 
have the highest quality growth during 1999-2000, followed by a lower growth during 2000-2001 and the 
lowest quality growth during 2000-2001. Given the poor status of service coverage and quality in Peru’s 
water sector, For most other firms, the service quality level is quite stable over the time period. Overall, 
this result shows the importance of incorporating quality variables into a benchmarking scheme, 
publishing the report to public, and linking the scheme to reward/penalty. As we mentioned in the 
beginning of the paper, performance-based incentive standards such as quality-dependent price cap can be 
expressed as: CPI-X+Q, where CPI is the Consumer Price Index and the X-factor is the productivity 
offset, which is based on the regulator’s assessment of the potential productivity growth of the regulated 
firms. Q is a quality factor which allows the companies to increase/decrease rates or retain more/less 
revenue when quality improves/degrades. The quality change (QC) component provides useful 
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information about Q. The regulator can use other relevant information such as the minimum quality 
standards and single dimension quality indicators to select appropriate Q targets. However, our QC index 
is based on the assumption of multiplicative quality separability (equations (20)-(23)), which has to be 
tested. Based on Fare et al. (1995), the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) is compared to the 
Quality-separated Malmquist Productivity Index (QMPI). If the results are similar, the data are consistent 
with the assumption of multiplicative separability. 
The Pearson correlation between MPI and QMPI is 0.926 and the non-parametric Spearman 
ranking correlation is 0.943, both of which are significant at 0.01 level. A two sample t-test assuming 
unequal variance is conducted. The null hypothesis that the sample means are equal cannot be rejected. 
(p=0.368)17. Therefore, the assumption of multiplicative separability is not rejected. 
6. Concluding Observations 
In emerging markets, those developing and implementing public policy must give attention to 
service quality issues, including low coverage for many infrastructure services (Holt, 2005). As a tool to 
reduce the information gap between regulators and firms and introduce competition through regulation, 
yardstick regulation should include quality, otherwise low cost and low quality companies will be labeled 
as “efficient”. This study uses different types of DEA models (CCR and preference structure) to capture 
the regulator’s preferences and illustrate the importance of including service quality measures and 
regulatory preference into benchmarking. The Quality-separated Malmquist Productivity Index is then 
introduced in order to analyze the quality change, efficiency change and shifts in the frontier. The results 
show a small decline in service quality from 1998-2001, which indicates the lack of appropriate 
incentives for the companies to improve their service quality under the regulatory system utilized during 
this time frame18. .   
One additional use of benchmarking comparisons is to link managerial incentives more directly 
                                                        
17 The assumption underlying the t-test required that the populations be normally distributed. In order to test the robustness of the 
result, we conduct the Kruskal-Wallis Test, a non-parametric test. Again, the null hypothesis can not be rejected. 
18 During this time period, SUNASS lacked instruments for rewarding or penalizing firms for performance. The overall weak 
record in service quality should be a signal to policy-makers that the “naming and shaming” approach (reflected in the 
nine-component scoring system) was not well publicized or that managers were not disciplined by local authorities when their 
utilities received “bad grades” from SUNASS 
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to performance. Some scholars (e.g. Shuttleworth 2005, Cubbin, 2005) are skeptical of applying 
efficiency scores due to the sensitivity of the model specification and estimation. However, caution should 
not preclude the thoughtful application of appropriate models.  The types of models presented here serve 
as catalysts for (1) collecting data to mitigate information asymmetries, (2) identifying sector trends and 
performance outliers, and (3) designing incentive-based managerial compensation plans (Mugisha, Berg, 
and Muhairwe, 2007). It is likely that far more waste has occurred due to poor management practices (and 
weak incentives) in developing countries than to the misapplication of infrastructure benchmarking 
techniques. 
 
Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Outputs       
Water Billed (m3) 6786308  8285202  132917  32990614 
Number of customers 141379  179617  6908  809158  
Coverage (%) 78  14  26  99  
Positive rate of chlorine tests (%) 86  17  4  100  
Continuity of service (hours/day) 16  5  5  24  
Inputs       
Operation Cost (S/.) 5651864  8180070  117737  44465016 
Water Connection 24329  30866  1003  148511  
 
 
Table 2: DEA Model Specification 
  Model 1 (Basic Model) Model 2 (Comprehensive) Model 3 (Preference Structure) 
Inputs Operating costs Operating costs Operating costs Number of water connections Number of water connections Number of water connections 
Outputs 
Volume of water billed Volume of water billed Volume of water billed 
Number of customers Number of customers Number of customers 
  Coverage Coverage 
  Positive rate of chlorine tests Positive rate of chlorine tests 
  Continuity of service Continuity of service 
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Table 3: Efficiency Score of Model 2 (1996-2001) 
Firm\Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1    1.000  1.000 
2   1.000 0.938  0.853 
3   1.000 0.857 1.000 1.000 
4    0.848 0.914 0.821 
5    1.000 0.995 0.995 
6 0.975 0.921 0.877 0.846 0.789 0.700 
7 0.917 0.995 0.972 1.000 0.921 0.932 
8 0.901 0.838 0.807 0.882 0.716 0.680 
9    0.697 0.692 0.663 
10  0.652 0.778 0.863 0.690 0.826 
11  0.647 0.731 0.674 0.670 0.550 
12   0.657 0.676 0.673 0.689 
13 0.654 0.717 0.725 0.781 0.754 0.782 
14  0.700 0.697 0.733 0.791 0.818 
15 0.768 1.000 0.761 0.722 0.777 0.914 
16   0.624    
17 0.869 0.832 0.854 0.871 0.794 0.756 
18   0.994 1.000 0.872 0.904 
19  0.832 0.747 0.854 0.976 1.000 
20   0.715 0.832 0.830 0.815 
21 0.683 0.710 0.726 0.790 0.795 0.897 
22 0.738 0.696 0.705 0.881 0.940 0.931 
23 0.574 0.567 0.604 0.606 0.576 0.612 
24 0.755 0.657 0.682 0.580 0.583 0.573 
25   0.732 0.908 0.766 0.786 
26 0.768 0.737 0.669 0.748 0.768 0.762 
27 0.683 0.581 0.637 0.842 0.788 0.806 
28 0.558 0.593 0.731 0.649 0.675 0.766 
29 0.749 0.735 0.842 0.698 0.683 0.678 
30   0.558 0.895 1.000 0.800 
31   0.667 0.731 0.704 0.800 
32   0.664 0.799 0.808 0.795 
33 0.751 0.764 0.685 0.690 0.666 0.692 
34   0.780 0.785 0.763 0.800 
35  0.674 0.723 0.769 0.815 0.746 
36 0.809 0.691 0.682 0.731 0.627 0.654 
37 0.667 0.618 0.560 0.658 0.816 0.819 
38   0.569 0.603 0.647 0.661 
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Table 4: Correlations of Efficiency Scores (order by Models 1,2,3) 
 
Correlation Basic Comprehensive Preference 
Basic 1   
Comprehensive 0.882** 1  
Preference 0.168* 0.292** 1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5: Malmquist Indexes, Efficiency Change and Frontier Shift (1998-2001) 
Company 
1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 1998 vs 2001 
Malmquist 
Index 
Efficiency 
Change 
Frontier 
Shift M EC FS M EC FS M EC FS 
3 0.968  1.000  0.968  1.181  1.000  1.181  1.259  1.000  1.259  1.406  1.000  1.406  
6 0.968  1.000  0.968  0.954  1.000  0.954  0.917  0.780  1.176  0.920  0.780  1.180  
7 1.148  1.000  1.148  0.969  1.000  0.969  1.019  1.000  1.019  1.077  1.000  1.077  
8 1.248  1.061  1.176  0.884  0.998  0.886  0.968  0.778  1.243  1.078  0.824  1.308  
10 1.080  0.901  1.198  0.880  0.937  0.939  1.149  1.076  1.068  1.058  0.908  1.165  
11 1.008  0.916  1.101  0.961  0.939  1.023  0.764  0.708  1.079  0.809  0.609  1.329  
12 1.078  0.851  1.266  0.945  1.010  0.935  1.000  0.918  1.089  1.073  0.790  1.358  
13 1.017  0.898  1.133  0.962  1.081  0.890  0.991  0.992  0.999  1.001  0.963  1.040  
14 1.105  0.908  1.217  1.088  1.033  1.053  1.034  0.980  1.056  1.183  0.919  1.287  
15 1.069  0.870  1.229  1.039  1.155  0.899  1.111  1.099  1.011  1.208  1.104  1.094  
17 1.031  0.934  1.104  0.929  0.939  0.989  0.965  0.934  1.034  0.942  0.819  1.150  
18 1.285  1.000  1.285  0.856  1.000  0.856  1.022  1.000  1.022  1.067  1.000  1.067  
19 1.137  1.020  1.114  1.184  1.046  1.132  1.106  1.000  1.106  1.526  1.067  1.430  
20 1.247  0.981  1.271  1.001  0.978  1.023  0.981  0.962  1.020  1.132  0.923  1.227  
21 1.166  0.907  1.285  1.039  1.012  1.026  1.121  1.080  1.038  1.272  0.992  1.283  
22 1.457  1.096  1.330  1.051  1.000  1.051  0.991  0.985  1.006  1.361  1.079  1.261  
23 1.079  0.811  1.331  0.995  0.982  1.014  1.083  0.994  1.090  1.029  0.791  1.300  
24 1.113  0.860  1.294  0.986  0.978  1.009  1.005  0.965  1.042  0.986  0.811  1.215  
25 1.240  1.025  1.210  0.849  0.886  0.958  1.014  0.996  1.018  1.138  0.905  1.258  
26 1.123  0.932  1.205  1.018  1.152  0.883  0.937  0.905  1.036  1.126  0.972  1.159  
27 1.607  1.161  1.385  0.905  0.874  1.035  1.017  0.981  1.036  1.354  0.996  1.360  
28 1.017  0.916  1.111  1.061  0.983  1.079  1.147  0.859  1.335  1.111  0.773  1.437  
29 1.001  0.786  1.273  0.980  1.056  0.928  0.986  0.970  1.017  0.919  0.806  1.140  
30 1.701  1.113  1.529  1.109  1.011  1.097  0.832  0.867  0.959  1.458  0.976  1.494  
31 1.141  0.776  1.471  0.976  1.038  0.940  1.107  1.113  0.995  1.263  0.896  1.410  
32 1.415  0.970  1.459  1.003  0.953  1.053  1.007  0.965  1.044  1.291  0.892  1.448  
33 1.104  0.920  1.199  0.966  1.040  0.929  1.000  0.973  1.028  1.081  0.932  1.161  
34 1.137  0.918  1.239  0.981  1.024  0.958  1.026  1.009  1.016  1.114  0.948  1.175  
35 1.098  0.878  1.251  1.063  1.048  1.014  0.917  0.906  1.013  1.075  0.833  1.291  
36 1.170  0.843  1.389  0.862  0.944  0.913  1.031  1.007  1.024  1.041  0.800  1.301  
37 1.281  0.890  1.439  1.208  1.278  0.945  0.977  1.023  0.955  1.582  1.164  1.359  
38 1.114  0.857  1.300  1.109  1.029  1.078  1.021  0.948  1.077  1.160  0.835  1.388  
Average 1.167  0.937  1.246  1.000  1.013  0.989  1.016  0.962  1.060  1.151  0.910  1.267  
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Table 6: Malmquist Indexes with Quality Change 
Company 
1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 1998-2001 
Malmquist 
Index 
Quality 
Change 
Efficiency 
Change 
Frontier 
Shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
Quality 
Change 
Efficiency 
Change 
Frontier 
Shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
Quality 
Change 
Efficiency 
Change 
Frontier 
Shift 
Malmquist 
Index 
Quality 
Change 
Efficiency 
Change 
Frontier 
Shift 
3 1.386  1.210  1.028  1.114  1.221  1.038  1.000  1.176  1.144  0.926  1.000  1.235  1.998  1.169  1.028  1.663  
6 0.959  1.042  0.749  1.229  1.038  1.003  1.240  0.835  0.872  1.000  0.839  1.039  0.982  1.072  0.778  1.178  
7 1.245  1.150  1.000  1.083  0.965  1.062  0.985  0.923  0.957  1.008  0.930  1.021  1.186  1.199  0.916  1.080  
8 1.278  1.037  0.877  1.405  0.935  0.995  1.084  0.867  0.989  1.002  1.030  0.958  1.233  1.021  0.979  1.235  
10 1.134  0.998  0.978  1.162  0.859  1.038  0.838  0.988  1.186  0.985  1.156  1.042  1.083  1.011  0.948  1.131  
11 1.008  1.002  0.917  1.097  0.881  0.969  0.917  0.991  0.791  1.032  0.723  1.061  0.813  1.008  0.608  1.326  
12 1.192  1.001  0.883  1.350  0.987  0.989  1.019  0.980  1.033  0.999  1.002  1.032  1.178  0.995  0.902  1.313  
13 1.068  0.989  1.026  1.052  0.962  1.000  1.073  0.897  0.983  1.006  0.952  1.027  1.051  0.984  1.048  1.019  
14 1.114  1.002  0.927  1.200  1.092  1.002  0.997  1.094  1.046  1.002  1.016  1.028  1.233  1.017  0.938  1.293  
15 1.067  1.033  0.844  1.223  1.088  0.993  1.252  0.875  1.098  1.003  1.069  1.023  1.284  1.026  1.130  1.107  
17 1.031  1.000  0.934  1.104  0.926  1.001  0.931  0.994  0.968  1.000  0.942  1.028  0.936  1.000  0.819  1.142  
18 1.288  1.012  1.000  1.272  0.862  1.010  1.000  0.853  1.021  0.999  1.000  1.022  1.079  1.020  1.000  1.058  
19 1.133  1.000  1.020  1.110  1.185  0.998  1.046  1.135  1.106  0.998  1.000  1.109  1.519  0.996  1.067  1.429  
20 1.248  1.003  0.992  1.254  1.003  0.999  0.972  1.033  0.979  1.001  0.968  1.011  1.153  1.003  0.934  1.231  
21 1.165  1.002  0.908  1.281  1.029  1.000  0.984  1.046  1.128  1.003  1.111  1.013  1.289  1.007  0.992  1.291  
22 1.455  1.000  1.108  1.314  1.056  1.000  1.000  1.055  0.991  1.000  0.985  1.006  1.371  1.000  1.091  1.258  
23 1.077  1.000  0.822  1.310  0.998  1.000  0.979  1.019  1.085  1.000  0.997  1.088  1.036  1.001  0.803  1.290  
24 1.141  1.002  0.874  1.301  0.991  1.000  0.965  1.027  1.005  1.000  0.990  1.014  1.003  1.002  0.835  1.198  
25 1.240  1.000  1.025  1.210  0.849  1.000  0.886  0.958  1.014  1.000  0.996  1.018  1.138  1.000  0.905  1.258  
26 1.123  1.000  0.932  1.205  1.018  1.000  1.152  0.883  0.937  1.000  0.905  1.036  1.126  1.000  0.972  1.159  
27 1.626  1.002  1.175  1.381  0.906  1.004  0.860  1.050  1.026  1.001  0.998  1.028  1.389  1.008  1.008  1.367  
28 1.022  1.009  0.916  1.105  1.061  1.000  0.983  1.079  1.147  1.000  0.859  1.335  1.115  1.003  0.773  1.437  
29 0.994  1.000  0.786  1.264  0.979  0.999  1.056  0.929  0.988  1.001  0.971  1.016  0.919  1.000  0.806  1.140  
30 1.871  0.997  1.172  1.601  1.120  0.996  1.034  1.088  0.835  1.004  0.867  0.959  1.543  1.005  1.050  1.462  
31 1.142  1.001  0.776  1.471  0.976  1.000  1.038  0.940  1.107  1.000  1.113  0.995  1.269  1.006  0.896  1.409  
32 1.418  1.002  0.970  1.459  1.003  1.000  0.953  1.053  1.007  1.000  0.965  1.044  1.292  1.001  0.892  1.448  
33 1.104  1.000  0.920  1.199  0.966  1.000  1.040  0.929  1.000  1.000  0.973  1.028  1.081  1.000  0.932  1.161  
34 1.137  1.000  0.918  1.239  0.981  1.000  1.024  0.958  1.026  1.000  1.009  1.016  1.114  1.000  0.948  1.175  
35 1.098  1.000  0.878  1.251  1.063  1.000  1.048  1.014  0.917  1.000  0.906  1.013  1.075  1.000  0.833  1.291  
36 1.170  1.000  0.843  1.389  0.862  1.000  0.944  0.913  1.031  1.000  1.007  1.024  1.041  1.000  0.800  1.301  
37 1.281  1.000  0.890  1.439  1.208  1.000  1.278  0.945  0.977  1.000  1.023  0.955  1.582  1.000  1.164  1.359  
38 1.114  1.000  0.857  1.300  1.109  1.000  1.029  1.078  1.021  1.000  0.948  1.077  1.160  1.000  0.835  1.388  
Average 1.198  1.015  0.936  1.262  1.006  1.003  1.019  0.988  1.013  0.999  0.976  1.041  1.196  1.017  0.926  1.269  
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